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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals he r cc n\ iction foi one ecu int : f disti ibi ition of a controlled
substance, a second degree felony , in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)
(2002). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant t< ) UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
. ISSUES I'KKNEINTH) i !"N ANT.AL ANh STANhAKhN ( H"" HHVIl'V r
1 Wlii (I'm »• defense isiunsers prior representation of the State's confidential
informant created a conflict oi interest?
Standard of review: " \

neffective assistance o 1 counsel claim laiscil \\w Hie 111 •-. I

time on appeal pi esents a qi le stion of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 162
(citing State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct A pp 1998)).
2. Whether the trial court erred by relying on a pre-sentence in\ csugaiu>n -;
prepared b] Colora do ra thei tl lan I Jtali ai ithoi ities?

Standard of review: This Court reviews a trial court's sentencing decision for
abuse of discretion. See State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ^12, 84 P.3d 854.
3a. Should this Court review defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient
to support her conviction when defendant fails to marshal the evidence as required by
rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure?
Standard of review: No standard of review applies to this issue.
3b. If this Court reviews defendant's sufficiency claim, was testimony from the
State's confidential informant that she purchased methamphetamine from defendant
during a controlled buy, together with testimony from officers who monitored the buy,
sufficient to support defendant's conviction?
Standard of review: This Court will affirm the trial court's denial of a motion for
directed verdict based upon a claim of insufficient evidence "'if, upon reviewing the
evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [this Court] conclude[s]
that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of
the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, \
29, 84 P.3d 1183 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case requires interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-l(5)(a)
(2003), which states:
Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence
of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence
investigation report from the department or information from other sources
about the defendant.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with one count of distribution of a controlled
substance, a second degree felony. R. 1. A jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 75.
After the verdict was announced, the parties and trial court discussed the need for a presentence investigation report (PSI). R. 129: 180-81. Although defendant requested a
Utah-prepared PSI, the trial court concluded that it would use a recently prepared
Colorado PSI. Id. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve one-to-fifteen years at the
Utah State Prison to run consecutively to any other sentence imposed. R. 113-14; 130:
15-16. Defendant timely appealed. R. 117.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
The Controlled Buy
On the evening of 21 September 2002, a confidential informant (CI) contacted
Officer Archie Walker of the Grand County Sheriffs Office and told him that she had
arranged to purchase methamphetamine from defendant that night. R. 129: 39-40.
Officer Walker asked Officer Shaun Hansen of the Moab City Police Department to
assist him, and arranged for the CI to meet the two officers later that evening. R. 129: 23,
40. The three eventually met after midnight. R. 129: 40.
Officer Hansen searched the CFs vehicle while Officer Walker searched the CI
and also obtained a urine sample to test for drugs. R. 129: 41, 21. The officers' searches
did not reveal any drugs, weapons, or money, and the urine test produced a "clean" result.

1

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v.
Montoya, 2004 UT 5, If 2, 84 P.3d 1183.
3

R. 129: 21, 23, 41. Officer Walker tested an electronic listening device, confirmed that it
was working correctly, and attached it to the CI. R. 129: 21, 42. He also provided the CI
with $50 in cash to purchase the methamphetamine, having first recorded the serial
numbers of the bills. Id After agreeing to meet it the parking lot of the park service
building after the purchase, the three proceeded to defendant's residence. R. 129: 23, 50.
When the CI entered defendant's residence she found defendant, two males, and
two other females. R. 129: 88. The CI testified that when she told defendant that she
was there to purchase "dope," "defendant reached over, grabbed the dope, handed me the
dope. I handed her the money and said T've got to get this done.'" R. 129: 88. The
phrase "I've got to get this done" was a prearranged signal to Officer Walker that the CI
had completed the transaction and was on her way back. R. 129: 47, 88-89. Before
leaving, however, the CI returned a portion of the methamphetamine to defendant as a
"courtesy deal." R. 129: 91. The CI explained that when a drug dealer does not have a
"personal supply," it is customary to return a small portion of a drug purchase to remain
in "good standing" with the dealer. R. 129: 91.
The officers monitored the transaction via the transmission from the listening
device attached to the CI. R. 129: 22, 46-47. Officer Hansen testified that based on
what he could hear, the drug transaction was conducted between two females. R. 129:
33-34. Officer Walker testified that defendant's voice was "very prominent." R. 129: 47.

Neither party introduced the tape recording of the transaction into evidence
because of the poor quality of the recording. R. 129: 138-39. Officer Walker testified
that the live transmission from the listening device is of a better quality than the
recording. R. 129: 78.
4

The CI left defendant's residence and met the two officers at the prearranged
meeting place. R. 129: 23, 50. The CI produced a small baggie containing a white
crystallin[e] substance which field-tested positive for amphetamines. R. 129: 23-24, 50,
52. Officer Walker had the CI mark the baggie and the CI later identified the baggie at
trial. R. 129: 24, 50, 90. The State Crime Lab confirmed that the baggie contained 80
milligrams of methamphetamine. R. 129: 81.
The officers did not immediately arrest defendant because they planned to
continue using the CI for controlled buys. R. 129: 77. Consequently, the officers did not
recover from defendant any of the money they had given the CI to purchase the
methamphetamine. R. 129: 73.
Defendant *s Evidence
On cross-examination, the CI admitted that she approached Officer Walker about
becoming a confidential informant because she was seeking assistance with some drug
charges of her own. R. 129: 54, 94. Because of her work as a CI, prosecutors dismissed
"a couple of cases" in Salt Lake. Id, The CI also received a favorable sentencing
recommendation on a Grand County charge for possession of a controlled substance. R.
129: 54-55. Despite the favorable recommendation, however, the CI was sentenced to
serve zero-to-five years in prison and was incarcerated when she testified at defendant's
trial. R. 129: 56-57, 91. The CI also had a prior forgery conviction. R. 129: 92.
The CI admitted that approximately five years prior to trial she had been upset
with defendant because defendant was dating a particular individual. R. 129: 98-99. The
CI also admitted "I've been in three in-patient drug programs, and obviously I've
5

relapsed every time." R. 129: 100. The CI acknowledged that she was still dealing with
her drug addiction when she made the controlled buy in this case and that a "person that
is in an addicted mind frame pretty much will say anything necessary." R. 129: 102.
Defendant's brother, John Caine, testified that the CI was "very spiteful" towards
defendant because the defendant had interfered with the CI's attempts to develop a
relationship with him. R. 129: 108-10. Caine admitted that on the night of the controlled
buy the CI greeted him while he was in a garage on defendant's property. R. 129: 113,
114. He also testified that although he was in the garage, rather than the residence, he
was not aware of any drugs being sold that night. R. 129: 114.
Lisa Roman testified that the CI has a reputation as "not very truthful, or honest."
R. 129: 127.
Finally, Jennifer Rodocker testified that she was at defendant's residence on the
night of the controlled buy and admitted that the CI was present also. R. 129: 129.
Rodocker did not recall, however, that any drugs were sold that night. R. 129: 130.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Defendant's conflict of interest claim fails because she does not demonstrate
that counsel was required to make a choice that would advance his own interests to her
detriment. Rather, defendant merely argues that her counsel had a conflict because he
previously represented the State's CI.
Even assuming arguendo that counsel's prior representation of the CI was
sufficient to create an actual conflict of interest, defendant fails to demonstrate that the
conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. In fact, the record demonstrates the
6

opposite. Counsel vigorously cross-examined the CI and called several witnesses to
attack the her credibility and testimony.
II. The trial court did not err at sentencing in relying on a Colorado, rather than a
Utah PSI. Defendant was not entitled to a Utah-prepared PSI. Furthermore, defendant
fails to demonstrate that the Colorado PSI was inaccurate.
III. This Court should refuse to consider defendant's claim that the evidence was
insufficient to support her conviction because she fails to marshal the evidence. In any
event, defendant's claim fails because she simply asks this Court to reassess the CI's
credibility.
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DEFENSE
COUNSEL POSSESSED A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Defendant claims that her trial counsel had a conflict of interest because he
previously represented the State's CI in a separate case. Aplt. Br. at 10, 13-14.
Defendant claims that the conflict was especially troubling because counsel represented
the CI in a case in which she received an accommodation from the State because of her
work as an informant. Id. at 10. Defendant's claim fails, however, because she does not
demonstrate that an actual conflict existed, let alone a conflict that adversely affected her
trial counsel's performance.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to conflict-free
representation. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978); State v. Lovell,
1999 UT 40, \ 22, 984 P.2d 382. u[T]o show this right was violated, [defendant] must
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establish both that [her trial counsel] had an actual conflict of interest, and that the
conflict adversely affected [trial counsel's] performance. Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at \ 22
(citing State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997)). "To establish an actual conflict
of interest, [defendant] must show that [her trial counsel] had to make choices that would
advance his own interests to the detriment of [defendant's]." Id
Defendant "has the burden of demonstrating with specificity that an actual conflict
existed and adversely affected [her trial counsel's] performance." State v. Brandley, 972
P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added). To successfully shoulder this
burden, "a defendant must point to specific instances in the record to suggest an actual
conflict or impairment of his or her interests." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 75 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990). "There is no violation where the conflict is irrelevant or merely
hypothetical; there must be an actual, significant conflict." Id, Defendant fails to carry
her burden.
Defendant does not cite any specific instance in the record that would
demonstrate, or even suggest that her counsel was required to make a choice that would
have advanced his own interests at her expense. Rather, the only evidence of a conflict to
which defendant cites is that her counsel previously represented the CI in a case where
the CI allegedly received an accommodation from the State. Aplt. Br. 10-11.
The record does demonstrate that defendant's counsel previously represented the
State's CI. R. 129: 93. The record is not clear, however, that the previous

Defense counsel's first question to the CI on cross-examination was: "did I ever
represent you on a case?" R. 129: 93. When the CI answered "Yes," counsel asked,
8

representation occurred in a case in which the CI received an accommodation from the
State. Even assuming that defendant is correct on this detail, however, it does not
establish that her counsel "had to make choices that would advance his own interests to
[her] detriment." See Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at ^f 22. Defendant cites no other evidence in
the record to support her claim that counsel had a conflict of interest. Aplt. Br. at 10-14.
Although defendant fails to cite evidence that would demonstrate that her counsel
had a conflict of interest, some cases have held that counsel possesses an actual conflict
of interest when he cross-examines a former client. See, e.g., United States v. Moscony,
927 F.2d 742, 750 (3rd Cir. 1991) ("an attorney who cross-examines former clients
inherently encounters divided loyalties"); State v. Watson, 620 N.W.2d 233, 241 (Iowa
2000) ("counsel's dual representation of the defendant and a key prosecution witness"
created an actual conflict of interest); State v. Cisco, 861 So. 2d 118, 130 (La. 2003)
("This court has consistently held that a defense attorney required to cross-examine a
current or former client on behalf of a current defendant suffers from an actual conflict").
Even assuming arguendo that an actual conflict existed, defendant's claim
nevertheless fails because she does not demonstrate "that the conflict adversely affected
[trial counsel's] performance." Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at \ 22. Defendant does not even
attempt to demonstrate how her counsel's prior representation of the State's CI adversely
affected his performance. In any event, the record demonstrates the opposite.
"And, just for the record, Judge, do you waive the conflict for me to ask you questions in
this case?" Id. The CI responded, "Yes, I do." Id. This may have been sufficient to
waive any conflict between the CI and her former counsel based upon the prior
representation. The State does not contend, however, that this waived any conflict that
may have existed between counsel and defendant.
9

Counsel vigorously cross-examined the State's CI. For example, on crossexamination the CI admitted that she had received concessions from the State as a result
of her work. R. 129: 54-55, 94. She also admitted that she had served prison time for a
prior forgery conviction. R. 129: 100. The CI disclosed that she had previously been
upset with defendant because defendant was dating a particular individual. R. 129: 9899. She also admitted "I've been in three in-patient drug programs, and obviously I've
relapsed every time." R. 129: 100. Moreover, the CI acknowledged that she was still
dealing with her drug addiction when she made the controlled buy in this case and that a
"person that is in an addicted mind frame pretty much will say anything necessary." R.
129: 102.
Defense counsel also called several witnesses to attack the CFs credibility and
testimony. Defendant's brother, John Caine, testified that the CI was "very spiteful"
towards defendant because defendant had interfered with the CI's attempts to develop a
relationship with him. R. 129: 108-10. He also testified that he was not aware of any
drugs being sold at defendant's residence on the night in question. R. 129: 114. Lisa
Roman testified that the CI has a reputation in the community as "not very truthful, or
honest." R. 129: 127. Defense counsel also called Jennifer Rodocker, who testified that
she was at defendant's residence on the night of the controlled buy, but did not recall that
any drugs were sold. R. 129: 129-30.
Defense counsel also vigorously cross-examined the two officers. For example,
when pressed on cross-examination, Officer Walker admitted "I don't know that I can say
that I knew [defendant's] voice at that time." R. 129: 69. This contradicted prior
10

testimony from both officers that Officer Walker had identified defendant's voice while
monitoring the transmission from the listening device. R. 129: 22, 47.
Defendant has failed to show that her counsel possessed an actual conflict of
interest that adversely affected his performance. See Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at f 22.
Moreover, the record demonstrates that defense counsel zealously advocated on
defendant's behalf. Accordingly, her conflict of interest claim fails. See id See also
United States v. Flynn, 87 F.3d 996, 1001 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The mere fact that a trial
lawyer had previously represented a prosecution witness does not entitle a defendant to
relief. The defendant must show that this successive representation had some actual and
demonstrable adverse effect on the case, not merely an abstract or theoretical one")
(citing Simmons v. Lockhart, 915 F.2d 372, 378 (8th Cir. 1990)); State v. Dhaliwal, 79
P.3d 432, 439-40 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (rejecting defendant's argument that his
counsel's prior representation of adverse witnesses created a conflict of interest when
defendant failed to show any adverse effect on counsel's performance).
II. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO REQUIRE THE
PREPARATION OF A UTAH PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT
Defendant claims that the trial court erred at sentencing by relying on "an outdated
and inaccurate" PSI prepared by Colorado authorities, rather than a PSI prepared by Utah
authorities. Aplt. Br. at 16-17. Defendant also claims that she did not have an
opportunity to review the Colorado PSI prior to sentencing. Aplt. Br. at 17.
"[D]ue process requires criminal proceedings including sentencing to be based

11

upon accurate and reasonably reliable information." State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, f
8, 12 P.3d 110 (citing State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 1994)). A defendant "is
entitled to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual information
upon which his sentence is based. However, procedural fairness in sentencing is satisfied
when '[defendant ha[s] a full opportunity ... to examine and challenge all factual
information upon which the court based his sentence.'" Id. (quoting Gomez, 887 P.2d at
855) (first alteration and ellipsis in original).
Defendant was not entitled to be sentenced based upon a Utah-prepared PSI. The
statute that provides for the preparation of PSI's states, "the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report
from the department or information from other sources about defendant." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-18-l(5)(a) (2003) (emphasis added). Therefore, the trial court had discretion
to decide whether a PSI was necessary.
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in declining
to order a Utah-prepared PSI. Although defendant claims that the Colorado PSI was
"outdated and inaccurate," she does not identify any erroneous information in the report.
Aplt. Br. at 16-17. This Court should therefore refuse to consider this claim because it is
inadequately briefed. See State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, \ 13, 72 P.3d 138 ("An issue
is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the
burden of research and argument to the reviewing court") (citing Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT
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App 370, | 8, 995 P.2d 14) (further quotations and citations omitted)); see also Utah R.
App. P. 24.
In any event, the trial court relied upon accurate information at sentencing.
Defendant never claimed below that the Colorado PSI contained inaccurate information.
She claimed only that the Colorado PSI was outdated because her circumstances had
changed substantially since its preparation. R. 130: 5 (a copy of the sentencing transcript
is attached as Addendum A). Defendant, however, informed the trial court of her
allegedly changed circumstances.
The Colorado PSI was prepared 6 June 2003 as a result of defendant's conviction
for, among other things, possession of a schedule II controlled substance and possession
of drug paraphernalia. R. 84. In this case, defendant was sentenced only four months
later, on 7 October 2003, for her conviction of distribution of a controlled substance. R.
113-14. Defendant explained to the trial court that since the preparation of the Colorado
PSI she had stopped doing drugs, had entered into an "intensive out-patient treatment
program," and was now accepting her family's support and working full time. R. 130: 56 (Add. A). Even assuming that all these things actually occurred in the four months
following the preparation of the Colorado PSI, defendant informed the trial court of the
changes. Therefore, the trial court knew of defendant's allegedly changed circumstances
when it sentenced her.
As noted above, defendant's brief fails to identify any erroneous information in
the Colorado PSI. Consequently, defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to order a Utah-prepared PSI.
13

Furthermore, although defendant claims that she did not have an opportunity to
review the Colorado PSI prior to sentencing, Aplt. Br. at 17, the record demonstrates
otherwise. The prosecutor provided a copy of the Colorado PSI to both the trial court and
defendant's counsel on 29 September 2003. R. 76-102. Defendant was not sentenced
until 7 October 2003. R. 113. Although defendant fired trial counsel and retained new
counsel prior to sentencing, new counsel entered his appearance on 1 October 2003,
allowing him at least six days to review the Colorado PSI with defendant.4 R. 106.
Neither defendant, nor her new counsel objected at sentencing that they had not had
sufficient time to review the Colorado PSI.
In fact, the record demonstrates that new counsel had reviewed the Colorado PSI
prior to sentencing. Defendant's counsel argued at sentencing that the Colorado PSI was
outdated because "it dates back to June of this year." R. 130: 5 (Add. A). Defendant's
counsel also acknowledged that "in the report that Your Honor has before you, Colorado
does indicate that she needs an in-patient drug treatment program." R. 130: 9-10 (Add.
A). Therefore, the record refutes defendant's claim that she did not have the opportunity
to review the Colorado PSI.

4

Rule 21.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that defendants be
provided PSI's three working days prior to sentencing. Utah R. Crim. P. 21.5(b).
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III. THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER
DEFENDANT'S SUFFICIENCY CLAIM BECAUSE SHE FAILS
TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for
distributing a controlled substance. Aplt. Br. at 18-20. This Court should refuse to
consider this claim because defendant fails to marshal the evidence.
To attack her conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient,
defendant must first marshal all the evidence supporting her conviction and then
demonstrate how that evidence is insufficient. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). To fulfill
this responsibility, defendant must present, "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
[defendant] resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv.
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (UtahCt App. 1991).
Defendant fails to satisfy this burden because she does not even acknowledge, let
alone marshal, any of the evidence supporting her conviction. Aplt. Br. at 20. Most
significantly, defendant ignores the CI's testimony that she purchased methamphetamine
from defendant. Defendant also ignores the officers' testimony that they searched the CI
prior to the controlled buy and did not find any drugs, that they monitored the transaction
via the listening device attached to the CI, and that the CI provided them with 80
milligrams of methamphetamine after leaving defendant's residence. Consequently,
defendant has failed to marshal the evidence. See West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1315.

15

Defendant's failure to marshal is especially egregious because the State previously
moved to strike defendant's brief for, among other things, failing to comply with the
marshaling requirement. See Order dated 8 April 2004 at 1, attached as Addendum B.
This Court granted the motion, finding that "[t]here is no attempt to marshal the evidence
in her argument." Id. at 2 (Add. B). Defendant has filed a new brief, but has again failed
to marshal the evidence.
Given defendant's failure, this Court should decline to review her claim that the
evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. See State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,
Tf 61, 28 P.3d 1278 ("Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence and demonstrate that
the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous in light of the evidence allows us to
affirm the court's findings on that basis alone"); State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, ^f 6,
36 P.3d 533 ("We conclude that Defendant failed to meet this [marshaling] burden.
Thus, we decline to further address Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence").
In any event, defendant's sufficiency claim fails on its merits. Her claim is
essentially nothing more than a challenge to the CI's credibility. Aplt. Br. at 20.
Defendant first notes that the CI was a convicted felon, had a history of drug
involvement, and a "history of enmity" towards defendant. Id. Defendant then argues
that "[reasonable minds must have entertained doubt about the veracity and credibility of
the purported chief witness." Id. (emphasis in original). Defendant also "respectfully
requests that this Court review, weigh and consider the evidence herein." Id.
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This Court, however, "will not reweigh the evidence or disturb the jury's verdict
unless the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to an element of the crime." State v.
Hqffhine, 2001 UT 4, ^ 23, 20 P.3d 265. Moreover, it "is within the exclusive province
of the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence." State
v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, ^ 11, 54 P.3d 645 (quotations and citation omitted).
Based on the jury's verdict, rendered in less than forty minutes, R. 56c, it found
the CI to be credible. Her testimony that she purchased methamphetamine from
defendant, coupled with the officers' testimony regarding the controlled buy, was not "so
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to an element of the crime." Hqffhine, 2001 UT 4, at 123. Therefore,
defendant fails to demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction and
sentence.
Respectfully submitted

J^

August 2004.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

0137-94.

3

MR. JONES:

Good morning, Judge.

4

THE COURT:

Mr. Jones.

5

over this case?

6
7

MR. JONES:

10

If the Court please, Judge.

And my understanding is that counsel has
prepared to move the Court, and to file his withdrawal
at this time.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. FITZGERALD:

13

Is that you, Mr. Fitzgerald?
Yes, Your Honor.

I do have

that document for the Court.

14

THE COURT:

15

You don't object to that, do you,

16

And

I have filed an appearance.

8
9

You're just taking

Okay.

Fine.

Ms. Morgan?

17

MS. MORGAN:

18

THE COURT:

19

Mr. Jones, are you prepared for sentencing

20

No, I don't.
Motion is granted.

now?

21

MR. JONES:

22

However, I do have a presentation to make to

23

We are, Judge.

the Court with respect to that.

24

THE COURT:

Okay.

25

Let ! s hear first what the State's

1

recommendation is.

2

Ms. Morgan?

3

MS. MORGAN:

Your Honor, the State's

4

recommendation is prison.

5

at the end of Ms. Mallow's trial.

6

That was my recommendation

If the Court recalls, I had presented the

7

Court with a pre-sentence report out of Colorado.

8

Ms. Mallow has just recently been found guilty of

9

similar charges there.

10
11

And their recommendation is

also prison.
Apparently that case is up on appeal and

12

she's allowed to remain a free person in the interim,

13

but I think that this is clearly a case, and an

14

individual with a criminal history that dictates

15

confinement into the Utah State Prison.

16
17

THE COURT:
report with me.

Can you --

18

MS. MORGAN:

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. MORGAN:

21

I don't have that pre-sentence

Yeah.

I have it.

Wait a minute.

Maybe I do.

I put a certificate or

something on it, so perhaps --

22

THE COURT:

I do have it.

23

That's right.

24

All right.

Mr. Jones.

25

MR. JONES:

Your Honor, may it please the

I do have it.

1
2

Court.
Ifm asking the Court to reconsider the

3

Court's decision, made upon the occasion of the trial,

4

not to order a pre-sentence report from AP&P.

5

This report is outdated.

It dates back to

6

June of this year.

7

in the circumstances of Jean Mallow since that date,

8

and we feel that those changes are important to be

9

memorialized in a pre-sentence report.

10

There has been a substantial change

The Court very well may, after receiving

11

that report, decide to follow the recommendation that

12

was made to the Court in the Colorado case, but we

13

would ask for an opportunity to have that pre-sentence

14

investigation done by Utah authorities.

15

to and trusted by this Court, I assume, and people who

16

are in a position to evaluate Jean in her present

17

circumstances, and are in a position to see whether or

18

not there is some program available here in Utah that

19

might address her needs and the needs of the community.

20

And there have been just a number of changes

People known

21

that have happened, Judge, since the time of the

22

preparation of that report recommending prison.

23

no longer doing drugs.

24

is aware from looking at that report, she has a serious

25

history of drug involvement, but almost all of her

She is

She has a history, as the Court

6

problems are either drug problems, drug charges, or
drug-related charges.
She has been an addict to methamphetamine at
least since

!

9 5 , as far as I f m able to determine.

She, however, is no longer doing drugs.

She

just basically gave it up.
Since the date that this report was
prepared, she has entered into a program that is
available here in town at Four Corners, an intensive
out-patient treatment program.
She is now accepting the family's support.
The family support has always been there.

Her mom and

her other family members, many of whom are here today,
have always been supportive of her, but as she
characterized it to me today, she was never accepting
of that family support.
She's working full-time now, for her mother
in the store, and she has had no further trouble with
the law.
All of these are things that have occurred
since the date of the preparation of that report.

And

we're just asking, Judge, that you give her an
opportunity to be looked at by AP&P, and see if they
think that she is doing enough now that she might be
eligible for some type of disposition other than going

1
2

to the Utah State Prison.
She strikes me as a decent person who got

3

involved in drugs at a relatively young age.

4

no juvenile history.

5

I believe, 21, or 22 years of age, and she starts

6

getting in trouble.

7

basically this is the period of time in which she

8

became to be involved with the use and abuse of

9

controlled substances.

10

She had

Then all of a sudden she returns,

I talked to her about that, and

But, Judge, I know that's not something that

11

we look to as an excuse, but if we look to it as an

12

explanation for her conduct, and if we look at the

13

possibility that AP&P may be able to fashion some

14

recommendation for her that doesn't include prison, for

15

example, a county jail stay, an in-patient drug

16

treatment program, something of this sort.

17
18

I'm just —

Judge, I just feel that it's

being rushed along a little too quick.

19

There was a jury trial on this.

She was

20

found guilty on September 29th, and here we are today

21

being sentenced, and basically this is October the 7th,

22

so it's nine days later.

23

And basically what has happened is that the

24

county attorney has furnished you with this report and

25

said, Well, we don't need to have a report because

1

we've got this report from Colorado that was done back

2

in June.
And, Judge, Ifm just importuning you.

3

And I

4

think that's the correct word.

5

word if I wanted to give up any more of my dignity than

6

I am by doing that.

7

the same opportunity that most criminal defendants get,

8

to be looked at by AP&P and to see if there is any

9

avenue of resolution of this matter short of sending

10

And I'd use the other

But I just hope you'll give her

her to prison.

11

I just have some serious philosophical

12

problems with sending someone to prison on the basis of

13

a report generated in a foreign state, and by people

14

who don't understand the Utah system, who don't

15

understand the availability of programs here in Utah,

16

who really took none of that into account, I think, in

17

preparing their report.

18

this long history of drug involvement, bye-bye.

19

they sentenced her to prison.

20

that now.

21

They basically said she has
And

She's out on appeal on

To me, she's made all of her court

22

appearances here.

She has pledged to me that if Your

23

Honor will give her the opportunity to at least talk to

24

AP&P and let them look at her present circumstances,

25

she'll make her court appearance.

She won't take off.

1

If at the end of that six-week period of

2

time, or four-week period of time, or however long it

3

is required here in this county, if Your Honor still

4

feels at that time that a prison sentence is

5

appropriate, at least we will have looked at all of the

6

options that are available.

7

That's kind of how I feel about it, Judge.

8

THE COURT:

9
10

Well, you haven't changed my

mind about whether there's much point in getting a
pre-sentence report.

11

So did you want to address the State's

12

sentencing recommendation?

13

it, in essence.

You've already addressed

14

MR. JONES:

15

The only other thing I would say about that

16

is that, in my next pitch to the Court would be not to

17

send her to prison.

18
19

Thank you, Judge.

She has never done any time, as I understand
it.

She's never done a prison sentence.

20

Is that correct, Jean?

21

MS. MALLOW:

22

MR. JONES:

23

Correct.
Have you done any substantial

jail terms?

24

MS. MALLOW:

25

MR. JONES:

No, never.
In the report that Your Honor

10

has before you, Colorado does indicate that she needs
an in-patient drug treatment program.

If the Court

would at least consider a period of jail time with
release to an in-patient treatment program when one can
be arranged, or after she has done a period of time in
jail, it would be my feeling that that would address
the problem we have here.
This —

Your Honor tried this case, and I

know you know all of the facts, and probably know them
a lot better than I do.

But my understanding of it is

that we're only talking about a sale of a quarter gram
of methamphetamine.

And while that certainly is the

crime that she's charged with, and it certainly is the
sentence that she's facing here today, it is -- it
doesn't appear that she's a substantial or big-time
dealer or anything like that.
It looks to me like, from my experience with
handling these matters, that she's somebody who has a
habit, and was probably doing this in order to provide
herself with the means to feed her own habit.

That's

my take on it.
So if you're -- if we're not going to get a
PSI.

I hope the Court will consider something short of

prison.
And if the Court does elect to do anything

1

other than jail time, does elect to send her to prison,
my final two requests would be, number one, that you
make that sentence run concurrently with the sentence
that she's facing out of Colorado.

I think that can be

done legally, because I believe she is still in
constructive custody on that sentence, even though
she's appealed it.
And so when she begins to do that sentence,
if that ever happens, I believe that the fact that this
sentence is imposed concurrently would not run afoul of
either our law or the law of Colorado.
And the final thing I would ask the Court to
do is, she has indicated that she is desirous of
appealing this matter.
She's talked with her bail bondsman.
bail bondsman is Jay Stocks.

Her

He has indicated that he

would be willing to continue that bail bond.
I'm wondering if, if we are going to be
looking at the possible of an appeal here, if the
Court, after imposing sentence, would stay execution of
that sentence, set this matter over until November 4th
for the purpose of a hearing on a certificate of
probable cause.

That way we won't have to get started

on her either beginning to do a long jail sentence, or
prison sentence, without the Court at least addressing

12

the issues that will be presented on appeal, and
determining whether there is, in fact, any basis for a
certificate of probable cause.
Beyond that, Judge, I would submit the
matter to the judgement of the Court.
THE COURT:

Is there anything you wanted to

say, Ms. Mallow?
MS. MALLOW:

I f m not sure what to say, other

than I know I've messed up in my past, bad.
but not this time.

Not this time.

You know,

I always stood --

you know, took what I had coming for what I messed up,
but not this time.
THE COURT:

So you weren't guilty in this

case?
THE WITNESS:

No, I wasn't.

No.

And I

tried to present -THE COURT:

This is the case where there's

always folks circulating around the house at two
o'clock in the morning?
THE WITNESS:

Yeah.

That —

my brother's

shop, yeah.
THE COURT:

So your theory was somebody --

the informant planted the drugs, or bought them from
somebody else?
MS. MALLOW:

I don't know where she got them

1

from.
I know we had a long, long hate for each
other.
I was best friends with her husband, Doug
Christensen for many years.

We had a major hate there.

I tried to bring evidence in to where she
had tried to set me up for checks that she had stolen
just two or three weeks earlier.
I tried to get the cops subpoenaed that she
admitted to that she had tried -- that she had lied
about.

She tried to get me into trouble for something

she had done.
MR. JONES:

Judge, in that regard, I believe

that the witness that we're talking about here, and I
am, as the Court is aware, a Johnny-come-lately, and
all I know is what I've been told at this juncture.
But my understanding is that the chief
witness against her was actually incarcerated at the
time that she provided the testimony.

And apparently

we see the benefit of a bargain to induce her
testimony.

And we would contemplate that that may

enter into consideration as far as any appeal that we
might file in the matter.
But we're just asking for some way to do
this short of having to send her to jail or to prison

14

until these issues -THE COURT:

There wasn't a bargain.

I think

she T s in prison.
MR. JONES:

Yes.

But I think there was a

bargain on some new charges, or something of that sort.
THE COURT:

Do you have anything more you

wanted to say, Ms. Morgan?
MS. MORGAN:

Only if you need me to.

This is her fifth felony conviction.

She's

previously been on -- unsuccessful on supervised
probation.
Her story about it not being hers kind of
grates my nerves, because there's something to be said
for someone who owns up to it.
Her Colorado case that she's facing a prison
conviction over, it involves numerous syringes, small
baggies containing methamphetamine.
It's completely unacceptable to sell
methamphetamine, whether you're doing it to build a new
house or to support your own habit.

And I think it's

important to send a strong message that it's
unacceptable.
If the Utah State Prison determines that she
just needs a slap on the wrist, they can let her out in
one year, which would be the same as a jail sentence.

1

But I think she needs to experience the prison
experience.
And as for Ms. Mallow's concerns about not
having a pre-sentence report, she's not entitled to
one, and a prison will prepare a post-sentence report
for anyone who shows up there without a pre-sentence
report.
THE COURT:

Well, the only thing I'm going

to mention, that hasn't already been discussed here, is
a reading from the pre-sentence report from Colorado.
She no longer drinks alcohol, and her last
use of methamphetamine was March 1, 2002.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

Well, the jury found that that

wasn't true.
So, she's -- I think she's been blowing
smoke with the agency in Colorado, and I can't trust
anything she says here.
It is the judgement and sentence of the
Court that the defendant be incarcerated in the Utah
State Prison for a term of not less than one nor more
than 15 years.

That she pay total fine and assessment

of $1,850, and that she pay $500 restitution to Grand
County for the services of the public defender.
She's remanded to the custody of the sheriff

1

to begin serving that time.
If you 1 11 file an application for
certificate of probable cause I f ll schedule it for a
hearing.
MR. JONES:

Thank you, Judge.

With respect to -THE COURT:

I f m not going to stay it

automatically here.
MR. JONES:

With respect to that sentence,

may that be concurrent with the sentence that has
already been imposed which has not been effectuated in
the State of Colorado?
THE COURT:

Well, I think that's something

that may very easily have been arranged between the two
prosecuting agencies if she'd come forward and accepted
responsibility.
Given her choice not to do that, I don't
think I'm going to impose that element.

So I'm going

to order this sentence is consecutive with any sentence
in another state.
Now, if they decide over there to make her
sentence concurrent with this one, I suppose they can
decide not to keep her any longer than they otherwise
would have, giving her credit for all the time

—

In other words, I can't stop Colorado from
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1

giving her credit for the time she serves in Utah.

2

they may do that if they see her as Utah's problem

3

rather than Colorado's problem.

4

But I'm not -- I'm not going to do that.

5

And it's a little difficult for me to --

6

since she's going to be going to the Utah system to

7

serve, how I do make it concurrent with that?

8

not even started serving that yet.

9

MR. JONES:

She's

Very well.

10

Thank you, Judge.

11

May we be excused?

12

THE COURT:

13

MS. MORGAN:

14

And

You may.
Thank you.
(Whereupon, Court was adjourned
concluded at 10:09 a.m.)
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Addendum B

FILED
UTAH APPELIATE COURTS

APR ~ 9 2004
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Ulrtnnr

APR 0 8 2004
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER
Case No. 20030867-CA

v.
Jean Mallow,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thorne
This matter is before the court on the State's motion to
strike Appellant's brief as noncompliant with Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24.
The State contends that Appellant's brief lacks citations to
the record, lacks sufficient facts to evaluate the issues on
review, and fails to marshal the evidence. Thus, the State
argues that Appellant's brief fails to comply with the
requirements of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) (7) , (9) .
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 sets forth the
requirements for briefs on appeal. Briefs must contain a
statement of the case and the course of proceedings below,
including citations to the record to support the recitation of
the proceedings below. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). The brief must
also contain "[a] statement of the facts relevant to the issues
presented for review," also with citations to the record. Id.
In addition to factual material, a brief shall have an
argument section, including citations to parts of the record
relied upon. If a paruy is challenging factual findings, that
party "must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9) .
Appellant's brief fails to comply with these requirements.
The course of proceedings below is set forth without citations.
Her brief statement of facts has citations to some material, but
again not to any of the proceedings. Appellant utterly fails to
provide facts relevant to the issues on review. She presents no
testimony from the witness she challenges; no testimony from
officers setting up or monitoring the drug buy; and no testimony
or evidence supporting the conviction, nor even any testimony or
evidence that arguably supports her own position, other than
minimal testimony supporting the fact that her attorney also
represented the adverse witness.

Appellant provides no more support or facts in her argument
section. There is no attempt to marshal the evidence in her
argument, and few citations to the record to support any of her
issues or contentions on appeal. For example, although arguing
that she did not have effective assistance of counsel because of
an attorney conflict, Appellant presents no facts to show that
the conflict was real or had an impact on her representation.
Neither does she present any facts that indicate the content of
the challenged sentencing report, or her alleged lack of
opportunity to rebut.
Appendix E of Appellant's brief is a judgment and commitment
in a case other than the case on appeal, and is not part of the
record on appeal.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's motion to strike
Appellant's brief is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
Appellant file a compliant brief thirty days from the date of
this order, and the State's due date for its brief be reset
accordingly. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appendix E shall not be
resubmitted with Appellant's corrected brief.
Dated this ffi day of April, 2004.
FOR THE COURT:

William A. Thome J r . / J u d g e

